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49 Introduction 
In its March 1992 working document(!>, the Commission conservatively estimated the number of 
cross-border payments at 400 million each year" and at half this figure, i.e. 200 million, those not 
exceeding ECU 2 500 in value. Based on more recent figures(2>,  the Commission has calculated 
that, alone, the volume of cross-border credit transfers by the end of  this century will account for 
well over 350 million transactions per annum. However, cross-border credit transfers accounted 
in  1991  for 29.5% (i.e.  117.6  million)  of the total  volume of cross-border payments.  These 
figures do not include payments by cheque and the growing number of card transactions. It may 
therefore be far from  unrealistic to assume that,  by the year 2000, the total  volume of cross-
border payments, excluding cash payments, will  exceed the figure of 1.2 billion per annum. It 
..  is important to note that, whilst cross-border payments may represent a small percentage of the 
total volume of payments, the average value of a cross-border payment is significantly higher  ' 
than the average value of a comparable domestic payment. 
Increasing cross-border activity in the Internal Market highlights the importance of early action 
to ensure that, in the medium term, the transparency, performance and stability of cross-border 
payment systems equals that of the best domestic payment systems. This fundamental objective 
is also  consistent with the path set out for transition to a single currency. Article 109j(4) of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community sets out 1 January 1999 as the latest date for the 
beginning of stage III of Economic and Monetary Union. 
The Commission, and indeed all  interested parties, will  therefore need to focus on how best to 
ensure that cross-border payment systems are fit to meet the challenges of  the internal market and 
economic and monetary union. 
The present communication is intended as a follow-up to the Commission working document of 
27 March 1992, which laid down a detailed programme of  work in the area of payment systems, 
as  well  as  to  the  Communication  of 14  December  1993<
3> from  Mr Vanni  d'Archirafi  and 
Mrs Scrivener. It consists of three separate sections, presenting the Commission's policy in the 
area of cross-border payments: 
I. 
II. 
III. 
(I) 
(Z) 
(l) 
The first section refers to the Communication of 14 December 1993  and addresses the 
plan of action set out therein; 
The second section develops principles on competition applicable to cross-border credit 
transfer systems; 
The third section deals with progress made on accompanying policies with a view to 
improving cross-border payment systems. 
SEC{92)621  fmal of 27 March 1992: "Easier cross-border payments: breaking down the barriers". 
Figures for  1991  (Annual Report of the  EC  Banking Federation,  1992) indicate the volume of EC cross-border credit transfers at 
117.6 million. A prudent estimate of  the medium!long term volume of  such transfers has been made on the basis of  the average yearly 
increment over the period  1989-1991  (in excess of IS% per annum), as  well as taking into account the increase in  EC  SWIFT 
messages over the period 1991-1993 (cat I, customer transactions). On the assumption that the reference rate of increment would 
hold unchanged, it can conservatively be estimated that in the medium!long term, i.e. over the next five years lending up to the year 
2000, the volume of  cross-border credit transfers will increase by approximately 100%, thus reaching n minimum 356 million credit 
transfers. 
SEC(93)1968: "Transparency and performance of remote cross-border payments". 
3 I.  Transparency and performance of remote cross-border payments 
(Follow-up to the Communication of 14 December 1993) 
(4) 
(l) 
In  1990,  the  Commission  adopted  Recommendation  90/1 09/EEC<4> 
("the 1990 Recommendation"), which set out principles, to be applied by institutions, on 
the transparency of banking conditions relating to cross-border financial transactions. 
The implementation of the  1990 Recommendation was discussed in the Commission's 
two advisory groups, Payment Systems Technical  Development Group (PSTDG) and 
Payment Systems Users Liaison Group (PSULG), whose members are drawn from banks, 
central banks, consumers, retailers and small businesses. 
In the PSULG, the European Credit Sector Associations, consumers, retailers and SMEs 
discussed  and  agreed  on  "European  Banking  Industry  Guidelines  for  Customer 
Information on Cross-border Remote Payments"  ("Industry  Guidelines") which were 
annexed to the Commission working document of March 1992. The industry Guidelines 
were to be implemented by  31  December 1992.  In the  1992 Working Document the 
Commission  clearly  stated that it  would  monitor. the implementation of the  Industry 
Guidelines and, should the self-regulatory efforts by the banking industry not have lead 
to  a  satisfactory  implementation,  it  would  bring  about  the  necessary  legislation  to 
provide  a  statutory  framework  for  customers'  rights  (para.  6.f).  The  Commission 
additionally indicated that it would look to the banking sector to ensure that the practice 
of  "double  charging"  (i.e.  unauthorized  deductions  from  the  principal  amount 
transferred) was ended by the 31  December 1992. If  problems persisted, the Commission 
would  examine  whether  other  measures  were  needed  to  end  such  double  charging 
(para.  26).  As to timing of cross-border transactions, the Commission announced that 
it would be "looking to those operating systems to set demanding targets for themselves 
and to include these in the information they  provide to customers".  The Commission 
would review progress in early  1993 (para.  28). 
' 
To  this  end,  the  Commission  carried  out  a  study  early  in  1993,  which  revealed 
shortcomings in the information provided to customers as well as in the performance of 
cross-border credit transfers (high incidence of  double charging, uneven quality in timing 
of execution).  '., 
On  the  basis  of these  results,  and  after  wide  consultation  of all  interested  parties 
(commercial banks, cen!ral banks, consumers,  SMEs and retail trade), the Commission 
adopted on  14 December 1993  a plan of action<
5>,  on the following lines: 
a  secorid  and  definitive  study  would  be carried  out in  early  1994,  to measure 
whether sufficient progress had been made; 
OJ NO  L67,  IS.3.1990, p.  39. 
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sufficient progress would be measured against a set of predetermined criteria: 
full  information was to be provided in at least two thirds of bank branches 
WNey~;  .  . 
for the purpose of the study, a maximum incidence of double charging of 
10% would be tolerated; 
progress on the times of execution would be assessed notably by reference 
to the results of the previous study. 
in  the absence of sufficient progress,  the Commission would introduce binding 
measures. To this end, a first draft of a proposal for a Directive was attached to 
the  communication,  to  be  discussed  with  government  experts  as  well  as  all 
interested  parties,  in  order for· it  to  be amended  in  readiness  for its  adoption, 
should this prove to be necessary. 
To implement the Commission's action plan, a new study was launched in the first half 
of 1994. The study indicated that, despite some measurable improvements, the banks did 
not meet the criteria set by the Commission. The results were the following: 
no written information was available in 50% of bank branches suNeyed; in the 
majority  of the  remaining  cases,  the  written  information  available  was  not  in 
accordance with the Industry Guidelines; 
36% of the transfers were subject to unauthorized deductions from  the principal 
amount transferred ("double charging''); 
the average time taken to carry out transfers did not improve in comparison to the 
1993  study; 
the  average  total  cost  of making  a  cross-border  credit  transfer  of an  amount 
equivalent to ECU 100  was ECU 25.4. 
Given this situation, the Commission considers that insufficient progress has been 
made and that a legally binding instrument is now timely and appropriate. 
Therefore,  the  Commission  has  proposed  a  directive<6)  and  authorized  its 
transmission to the European Parliament and the Council. 
In awaiting the entry into force of the proposed directive the Commission will call 
on the banking sector and the representatives of the consumers to enter into solemn 
voluntary commitments which anticipate the implementation of the provisions laid 
down in its proposed directive  •. 
Finally, the Commission, in full co-operation with the Member States, will make 
every effort to ensure that efficient redress procedures are made available to users 
of payment systems.  · 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on cross-border credit transfers. 
5 II.  Competition policy and cross-border credit transfers 
In  Annex  C to the March  1992  working  document(7>,  the  Commission  spelt  out the 
general conditions for the acceptability of specific kinds of interbank agreements in the 
area  of cross-border  credit  transfer  systems.  Those  principles  on  competition  were 
intended to provide general guidance for banks and other financial institutions intending 
to set up systems allowing for clearing, netting and/or settlement of cross-border transfer 
payments between them or linking existing networks with each other.  Those principles 
, . .  covered  the  criteria  applicable  to  agreements  on  membership  in  such  systems;  the 
. technical,  legal  and  operational  aspects  of the  services  rendered  to the  institutions' 
customers·~ and the sharing of the cost of a system between its participants. 
In  order to meet the  request  for  further  clarification  as  to the  extent to  which  the 
EC Treaty rules on competition apply to the setting up and functioning of cross-border 
credit transfer systems, and taking stock of intervening developments which have lead 
to the creation of a number of new transfer payment mechanisms, the Commission has 
decided to review these principles and to update them. 
The  Commission  has  adopted  a  draft  "Notice  on  the  application  of the  EC 
·Competition rules to cross-border credit transfer systems". This draft notice sets 
out the approach the Commission intends to take when assessing the compatibility 
of cross-border credit transfer systems with the competition rules of the EC Treaty. 
This  draft notice will  be published in  the Official Journal. This will  enable the 
Commission to take account of the reactions of interested parties when it adopts the 
notice,  which  will  replace  the  "Principles  on  competition  for  credit  transfer 
systems" contained in Annex C of the Commission working document of 27 March 
1992. 
ill.  Progress on accompanying measures aimed at improving cross-border payments 
(7)  . 
In the concluding section of its March 1992 working document, the Commission set out 
the  follow-up  which it considered  necessary.  The preceding  sections of the present 
communication provide examples of  that follow-up in the areas to which they relate. On 
other aspects, work is also under way or shortly to be undertaken.  What follows is a 
brief description of work under way in some of the more important areas. 
Annex C to SEC(92)621. 
6 III.l  The role of payment systems in  preparing for the transition to the ECU 
(8) 
The  process  of  planning  for  the  transition  to  a ·single  currency  should  m 
Commission's view be increasingly integrated with the process of  making impn 
to cross-border payment systems within the internal market. 
If investments in updated systems can be made over the coming years in the lif  u1  -
plans for the ECU, not only will the transition be made easier, but it will also be more 
rapid and less costly. 
While respecting the competence of the EMI in this area, the Commission will play its 
part in helping to increase the awareness of the ECU dimension in its work on payment 
systems.  As  a  first  step,  the Commission's  proposal  for  a  European Parliament and 
Council Directive on cross-border credit transfers places the status of the ECU on an 
equal footing with any currency of a Member State of the European Union. 
The Commission is  convinced  that the rapid  introduction of the ECU,  according to 
Article 109 1,  par.  4 of the Treaty, would be facilitated by making appropriate use of 
electronic media such as  electronic credit transfers, cards and  purses.  These payment 
instruments  could  make  a  major  contribution  to  a  smooth  and  publicly  acceptable 
changeover to the ECU, provided that their role is properly taken into account at an early 
stage in the planning process. 
Without  prejudice  to  the  initiative  launched  by  the  Commission  with  the 
communication on  "Practical problems involved in introducing the ECU as the 
European Union's single currency<
8>", the Commission intends to seek advice from its 
two  consultative  groups  on  payment  systems,  the  Payment  Systems  Technical 
Development Group  and the Payment Systems Users Liaison Group,  on the ways in 
which the payment systems can best be prepared for the introduction of the ECU. The 
Commissibn will inform the Consumer Consultative Council thereof. 
OJ No C 153,4.6.1994, p.  3. 
7 III.2  Simplification of reportin~: requirements for Balance of Payments statistics 
In most. Member States ther~ are special reporting req_ui.rements primarily.fo~  estab~lsh~ng 
balanc~ of payments statistics in  r€?Spect  Of transactions ·which ·~xceed.  a certain vruue· 
threshold  and ·which  involve  payments  to,"  or  from,  non-resident  accounts.  These 
requirements raise the cost and can increase the delay in making such transactions ·by 
comparison with domestic payments. Moreover, the nature of  the requirements enforced 
in the Member States often differs. 
In its March 1992 working document, the Commission stated that it would work towards 
a  high  minimum  reporting  value  threshold,  which  in  its  view  should  be  at  least 
ECU 10 000. The possibility of  standardising the fonnat for reporting transactions above 
the threshold would also help to simplify these procedures. 
The Commission stresses the need for rapid progress in the work currently under 
way in a Task Force of  .government experts under the aegis of the CQmmission on 
simplifying  and  harmonising·  the  reporting  procedures  used  throughout  the 
Community.  ·  ·  · 
·  DI.3  "Legal Framework" for cross-border payments 
In its March 1992 working document, the Commission noted that certain features of  the 
law in  a  number of Member States,  together with the differences between Member 
States• laws relating to payment systems, were a source of uncertainties and risks. This 
view was endorsed by the Committee of Governors of the central banks of the EC<
9>. 
Work began on thes.e  issues in a group of government legal  experts and central bank 
representatives, chaired by the Commission, early in 1993. The first phase of the work 
has consisted of establishing an inventory of  the legal situation in the areas of payment 
netting, settlement finality and credit transfers, in all Member States, which has led to 
a more precise identification of these problems. 
The next phase of the work is to explore the potential solutions and their consequences. 
The Commission is conscious of the fact that, to both central  banks and commercial 
banks,  the reduction of systemic risks  in  payment  systems could make  a  significant 
contribution to the efforts being made. to improve Europe's payment systems. 
The Commission, with the assistance of its working group on the legal framework 
for cross-border payments and in association with the EMI, will make every effort 
to  reach  operational  conclusions,  including  the  possibility  of a  proposal  for  a 
directive, on the question of settlement finality during 1995. 
<
9
> 
11Issues of common concern to EC Central Banks in the field of payment systems  .. , by 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on EC payment systems, September 1992. 
8 111.4  Linl{ages between automated clearine houses (ACHs) 
In  most Member States,  Automated  clearing houses,  or systems,  process millions of 
payments every day  in  a rapid, efficient and  economical way.  The economies of scale 
are such that the marginal cost of each payment is a tiny fraction of  the present cost for 
a typical cross-border payment. The Commission noted in its 1992 working document 
the potential  benefits which could result from  linkages between ACHs and stated its 
support  for  the  efforts  being undertaken  by  a  number  of banks and  ACHs  in  this 
direction. 
Since  1992,  a number of feasibility  studies on ACH-linkages  have been carried  out, 
which have demonstrated the technical feasibility of such projects. Full implementation 
of many of these projects has however been impeded by what is often claimed to be the 
absence of sufficient volume of cross-border  payments and,  therefore,  the lack of a 
business case.  An encouraging development ·has been the commencement in 1994 of a. 
pilot linkage between the Belgian and Gem1an ACHs, which others are following with 
interest. 
The Commission welcomes the developments aimed at the establishment of ACH-
linlmges, which it considers as a longer term response to the payment requirements. 
of an  internal  market and - to  an even .  greater extent - of an Economic  and 
Monetary Union. The Commission will maintain contac.t with all interested parties · 
. to assess how best to contribute to progress in this area. 
III.S  Transnarency of nayments made hy means of a nayment card 
The Commission, in its March 1992 working document, recognised that the infrastructure 
for card payment systems was already quite satisfactory. However, users pointed out, and 
the European Credit Sector Associations (ECSAs) recognised, that there was room for 
improvement in the transparency of customer information with regard to card payment 
instruments.  The Commission therefore invited the ECSAs to review the information 
given to customers about direct or so-called face-to-face payments, in the light of the . 
Guidelines elaborated for remote cross-border payments.  · 
Following an  inconclusive review of the situation  by the ECSAs and  in  the light of 
continuing demands for improvements on the part of users, the Commission has decided 
to launch an independent study. This should be finalised by June 1995 and its purpose is: 
to examine which information a customer should receive in order to make the best 
use of a payment card, to evaluate the cost of card payments and to be informed 
about mutual  responsibilities; 
9 to collect and examine a representative sample of standard contracts between card-
issuers and card-holders and statements which a customer receives subsequent to 
his transactions; 
to compare the results of  the first two phases to determine whether the information 
necessary to _customers is given in actual practice and, if so, whether it is given in 
appropriate ways; 
to indicate which improvements seem objectively justified. 
The Commission will discuss the study results with its two consultative groups on 
payment systems. In the light of this consultation, the Commission will  consider 
whether any  improvements are necessary and, if so,  how  best to  put them  into 
effect. The Commission will look to the European Credit Sector Associations and 
issuers  of payment card instruments to  ensure that any such improvem·ents are 
voluntarily addressed by 1st January 1996. In the light of progress achieved in this 
area,  the  Commission  will  consider whether a  legislative  instrument might  b.e 
appropriate. 
ID.6  Pre-paid cards (electronic purses) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
One development which has come a considerable way to~ards realisation since 1992 is 
.the pre-paid payment card, which ·instead of being merely an access device into a bank 
(or other) account, contains in itself a pre-paid store of value, for spending. 
The Commission has an interest in these developments under three main headings. In the 
first  place,  it is _likely  that  these  new instruments  will  in  due  course give  rise  to a 
number of questi,ons of a regulatory nature. Some·of these questions have already beert 
considered by the European Monetary Institute<•o>.  The EMI concluded that only banks 
should issue such cards. 
Secondly, the Commission has an interest in the promoti6.n of a competitive European 
technology in this, as in other areas. Under the ESPRIT programme, a project known as 
CAFE<11>  (Conditipnal Access For Europe) was launched in.l993 ·and has developed a 
prototype  electronic  purse  system.  This  will  be tested  during  1995  in  Commission 
premises.  The Commission has recently invited<
12>  interested parties to take part in  or 
observe the trial of the instrument.  · 
Report to the Council  of the European Monetary  Institute on  Prepaid Cards,  by. the 
Working Group on EU Payment Systems, May 1994.  · 
CAFE is the ESPRIT technological project No EP 7023'. 
OJ No C 230, 19.8.1994, p.  3~ (94/C 230/08). 
10 Finally, the scope for using pre-paid instruments for low value cross-border payments 
is  of potential  importance.  This function  can  be seen under two aspects.  On  the  one 
hand,  a  pre-paid  card  can  be  loaded with  any  currency ·including the  ECU,  if so 
designed, and WOUld therefore provide a  COi!Vepient i'nstrument during the present multi-
currency stage ofthe Community; ori the  oth~r hand, .the pre-:-paid card may provide 'an 
extremely convenient and  "user friendly" means. of adapting to the use of the ECU. 
The Commission has decided to launch a study on the regulatory implications in its field 
of competence,  in  particular  concerning  the  stability  of the  banking  system,  the 
protection  of consumers  and  the  promotion  of interoperable  cross-border  banking 
services. 
The Commission will disseminate the conclusions drawn from its study on pre-paid 
cards after discussing them with its two  consultative groups on payment systems 
and the EMI. 
11 ANNEX 1 
Proposal for a 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
on cross-border credit transfers 
13 EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
I.  Background 
(I) 
The present proposal for a directive is the result of a pro'cess,  consisting of a number of 
steps, which can be summarised as follows: 
A.  ·  In  1990,  the  Commission  adopted  Recommendation  9011 09/EEc<t> 
(1990 Recommendation) on the transparency of banking conditions relating to cross-
border financial  transactions.  The Commission recommended that "Member States 
. ensure that institutions which undertake cross-border financial transactions ...... apply 
the principles set out in the Annex". The said Annex laid down the basic principles 
relating to: 
ex-ante  customer information  concerning  cross-border  financial  transactions 
(1st principle)~ 
ex-post customer information about the commission fees and charges and the 
exchange rate applied (2nd principle); 
the  alternative  ways  of apportioning  commission fees  and  charges  between 
customers (originator and beneficiary), including the method to be applied by 
the customer's institution to ensure that the beneficiary is credited with the exact 
amount shown on the transfer order (3rd principle); 
in  the  absence  of an  agreement  to  the  contrary,  an  obligation  for  each 
intermediary institution to deal with a payment order within two working days 
of receipt of  the funds, including a partial refund of  the costs of  the transaction 
in the event of any delays in the execution (4th principle); 
unless  otherwise  stipulated  in  the  payment  order,  an  obligation  for  the 
beneficiary's institution to deal with a payment order not later than the working 
day following receipt of the furids (5th principle); 
an  obligation  for  in-stitutions  participating  in  a ·cross-border  payment  to be 
capable of dealing rapidly with customer complaints, including the possibility 
'for customers to refer the matter to one of the Member States' bodies,  to be 
created to this effect, competent to deal with such complaints (6th principle). 
OJ No L 67,  15.3.1990, p.  39. 
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B.  The results of a study<
2
> of the market ("Cost transparency in cross-border financial 
transfers")  carried  out in  the first' quarter of 1992  and  presented  in  August  1992 
revealed  a  number  of  shortcomings  relating  to  the  aspects  covered  by  the 
1990 Recommendation. 
C.  The implementation of  the 1990 Recommendation was discussed in the Commission's 
two advisory group~, Payment Systems Technical Development Group (PSTDG) and 
.Payment Systems Users Liaison Group (PSULG) whose members are drawn from 
banks, central banks, consumers, retailers and small businesses. 
In the PSULG, the European Credit Sector Associations,  consumers,  retailers and 
SMEs discussed and agreed on "European Banking Industry Guidelines for Customer 
Information on Cross-border Remote Payments" ("Industry Guidelines") which were 
annexed  to  the  Commission  Working  Document  "Easier  cross-border  payments: 
Breaking  down  the  barriers"(3).  The  industry  Guidelines,  covering  the  1st  and 
2nd  princ~ples  of  the  1990  Recommendation,  were  to  be  implemented  by 
31  December 1992. 
In the 1992 Working Document the Commission clearly stated that it would monitor 
the implementation of  the Industry Guidelines and, should the self-regulatory efforts 
by the banking industry not have led to a satisfactory implementation, it would bring 
about the necessary legislation to provide a statutory framework for customers' rights 
(para.  64).  The Commission additionally indicated that it would look to the banking 
sector to ensure that the practice of "double charging" (i.e. unauthorized deductions 
from  the  principal  amount  transferred)  was  ended  by  the  31  December 1992. 
If problems persisted, the Commission would examine whether other measures were 
needed  to  end  such  double  charging  (para.  26).  As  to  timing  of cross-border 
transaction$,  th~.Commission announced that it would be "looking to those operating 
systems  to  set  ·demanding  targets  for  themselves  and  to  include  these  in  the 
information they provide to customers". The Commission would review progress in 
early 1993 (para.  28).  · 
D.  Further to the Commission working document, the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution<
4> on 12 February 1993 in which it expressed the opinion that "the principle 
of  transparency ought to  be  defined by a Council directive  entailing the following 
mles: 
an obligation for the bank to infonn the potentia/user of  the various means of 
effecting payments which it is able to offer and their respective costs; 
the  user's right to  bear all charges concerned with a  cross-border payment, 
which should automatically exclude  'double charging'; 
A report prepared for the  Commission of the  European Communities (Consumer Policy Service) by  the 
Bureau Europcen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC). 
SEC(92) 621  final of 27 March 1992. 
Resolution A3..0029/93 concerning the systems of  payments in the context of  Economic and Monetaxy Union. 
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(6) 
a four-working day period  for the settlement of  the cross-border payment,· 
the user should have access to a redress procedure; the Commission will need 
to  provide  a  suitable  appeal  mechanism  for  small  and  medium-sized 
businesses." 
E.  With a view to  meeting the commitments laid down in its working document and 
having regard to the European Parliament's resolution, the Commission carried out a 
study<
5> in  the first  half of 1993,  the results of which were announced  on 29 July 
1993. These results confirmed the shortcomings revealed by the 1992 study. 
F.  On  the basis of these results,  and  after wide consultation  of all  interested  parties 
(commercial banks, central banks, consumers, SMEs and retail trade), the Commission 
adopted  on  14  December  1993<
6>. the  following  plan  of action,  contained  in  a 
Communication from Mr Vanni  d'Archirafi and Mrs Scrivener: 
"The banking industry is given a grace period to achieve the desired results in terms 
of transparency and performance  through self-regulation,  but under the  threat of 
possible  legislation.  The  Commission  will examine  the  progress of the  banking 
industry on performance and transparency by conducting a  second and definitive 
study at the beginning of  1994, i.e.  one year after the first study has been carried out 
and the implementation deadline for the Industry Guidelines has elapsed 
If  the  second study shows that the  banking industry has failed to  make sufficient 
progress,  the  Commission will propose legislative action in the form of  a  binding 
instmment (a directive).  To establish whether sufficient progress has been made,  the 
following criteria will be applied: 
full written information, in accordance with the different items listed under the 
Industry  Guidelines,  should be  provided in at least  two  thirds of branches 
surveyed (in Febmary 1993 4%); 
the problem of  "double charging" should be eliminated; a maximum incidence 
of  double charging of  10% (in Febntary 1993 43%) would be tolerated; 
in accordance with principle 4 of  Recommendation 901109/EEC,  each bank 
involved in a cross-border transfer should execute the payment no later than the 
business day following receipt of the payment order.  The  Commission will 
assess progress,  notably by reference to the results of  the previous study. 
"Remote cross-border payment services: transparency in conditions (\ffered and performance 
of transfers executed": Report for the Commission of  the European Communities (DG XV) 
by Retail Banking Research Ltd.  · 
SEC (93)  1968:  "Transparency and performance of cross-border payments". 
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(8) 
(9) 
To reinforce the Commission's readiness to introduce binding measures, a first draft 
proposal for a directive  has been prepared and [wm} annexed to  the  [December 
1993 Communication]. As soon as possible,  the Commission will convene a working 
party of  government experts to examine  this draft,  and on the  basis of comments 
received  from this group and elsewhere the text may be amended, in readiness for its 
adoption, should thisprove to be necessary in the light of  ~he proposed second study. " 
In  its  Communication  to  the  Council  of 22  December  1993C1>,  the  Commission 
repeated its commitment to take appropriate action, including lesgislative action, in 
the event that financial  institutions did  not take adequate  steps to introduce more 
transparent and more efficient cross-border payment services. 
G.  To implement the  Commission's  action  plan,  a  second  and  definitive  study  was 
launched in the first half of 1994, the results of which are the following: 
no written information was available in 50% of bank branches surveyed; in the 
majority of the remaining cases,  the written information available was not in 
accordance with the Industry Guidelines; 
36% of  the transfers were subject to unauthorized deductions from the principal 
amount transferred ("double charging"); 
the average time taken to carry out transfers did not improve in comparison to 
the 1993  study; 
the average total  cost of making a cross-border credit transfer of an  amount 
equivalent to ECU 100 was ECU 25.4. 
H.  In  its  Opinion<
8
> of 6  July  1994,  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  stated  a. 
preference for a code of  good conduct. However, the Economic and Social Committee 
advised that, if a directive were to be proposed, it should be limited to setting out a 
.general  framework.  The present directive follows this model,  by  allowing a large 
measure of freedom of contract.  · 
In its resolution<
9>  of 29 September 1994, the Council of the European Union invited 
the Commission to ensure that the obstacles to cross-border payments are removed. 
COM(93) 632 final:  "Making the most of the Internal Market:  Strategic Programme". 
ESC 854/94. 
SI(94)901, Annex 4, section V:  "Council Resolution on giving full scope to the dynamism 
and innovatory potential of small and medium sized enterprises, including the craft sector 
and micro-enterprises, in a competitive economy". 
18 Overall assessment 
The Commission  Strategic Programme dearly identified the establishment of effective cross-
border payment systems as one of the few requirements that still need to be met to ensure. the 
functioning of  the Internal Market, as the latter enters into its maturity stage. The need for action 
in this domain, which is designed to secure an improvement of cross-border payment services 
for the b~nefit of  consumers, individual and unincorporated businesses and SMEs, is all the more 
urgent as progress is made towards full Economic and Monetary Union. This need is confirmed 
by the increasing number of complaints addressed to the Commission and by the results of the 
repeated surveys carried out by the Commission. 
,.The steps summarised in  sections  l.A to  I.H above,  of which the  1994 study is one element, 
point  to  an  overall  trend  which  has  not  demonstrated  the  expected  improvements.  The 
Commission therefore considers that little progress appears to have been made and that a legally 
binding instrument is now timely and appropriate.  Therefore, the Commission has proposed a 
directive, a detailed description of which is made in section III below, setting out what may be 
considered as a number of essential conditions related to the transparency and the performance 
of cross-border credit transfers. 
Whilst covering all  cross-border credit transfers irrespective of the amounts involved, the scope 
of the present proposal is primarily intended to address the needs of consumers, individual and 
unincorporated businesses as well as SMEs which traditionally, but not exclusively, carry out 
lower-value cross-border transactions. 
The present proposal is also intended as a supportive measure which will  encourage banks to 
review  their  systems  to  ensure  that  the  quality  of the  services  they  publicise  is  effectively 
matched by the actual  quality of service, while ensuring that appropriate protection is afforded 
to users of credit transfer services. In doing so, the banks will  be in a position to identify and 
eliminate internal inefficiencies, thus "significantly contributing to the progressive lowering of  the 
cost of service production and,  consequently, the break-even point by reference to which they 
decide  their charging  policy  vis-a-vis users.  Finally,  institutions will  need to invest in staff 
training and in  the development of a true  "cross-border payment service" culture on which to 
build a competitive advantage, as is the case for domestic transfers. 
19 n.  Subsidiarity assessment 
1.  Which  are  the  objectives  of  the  directive,  having  regard  to  Community 
obligations? 
The principal objective is to ensure that in an  Internal Market, cross-border credit 
transfers may be made free of any impediment. The present directive is intended as 
a  supportive  measure  in  respect  of the  exercise  of the  four  freedoms  stated  in 
Article 7a of the Treaty, in particular the free movement of goods, persons, services · 
and capital, while ensuring a high level of consumer protection. 
The present directive is also intended, following up from the liberalisation of capital 
movements as  reached during stage I of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), as 
a further step towards the progressive implementation of full  EMU. 
2.  Does the action envisaged stem from an exclusive competence of  the Community? 
Exclusive competence:  Article  lOOa,  in conjunction with Article 7a. 
~· .  What are ·the  possi~ilities of.action.ava!lable to the Community . 
.. 
One possibility is a voluntary approach. This has however already been pursued since 
199'0  (Commission Recommendation 90/1 09/EEC) and throughout the consultation 
process which has  led  to  the  Communication  of 14  December  1993,  but has  not  .  . 
yielded the expected results. 
Therefore, .  as  explained  in  detail  in  section  I  above,  a binding instrument is  now. 
deemed both timely and necessary. 
4.  Is uniform legislation necessary or is a directive setting out the general objective 
and leaving i~plementation thereof to the Member States sufficient? 
For the reasons set out in s(l'ction I above (Background), the present Directive deals 
with aspects pertaining to the transparency  and  performance of cross-border credit 
transfers.  .  . 
The  provisions  in  section  II  of .the  directive  lay  down  general  transparency 
· requirements,  which  institutions  offering  remote  cross-border  payments  will  be 
required to respect. Member States and institutions are free to determine the precise 
contents of these general transparency requirements. 
The provisions in  section III of the directive contain performance rules of a more . 
detailed nature which are designed to give weight to the preceding transparency rules. 
Considering  the  cross-border  nature  of the  payments  in  question,  legislation  at 
national level would not suffice unless it were adopted in a substantively similar way 
in each Member State. The present directive describes what may be considered as a 
number of essential conditions. These conditions, although of a detailed nature, allow 
those institutions wishing to provide cross-border credit transfer services an almost 
complete freedom of contract, 
20 
.I Institutions decide themselves on the detailed specifications of  the services they offer. 
The directive underpins these specifications and sets out fall-back rules in case any 
essential details were not specified by the institution. Only one rule in this section is 
mandatory, although having a limited number of opt-outs, i.e. the clause setting out 
the obligation to safeguard funds of customers (where funds are mislaid or lost)~ . 
III.  Detailed commentary on  the Articles 
Article 1 
1.  The service of effecting  and  receiving  cross-border  credit  transfers  on  behalf of 
customers is, for the most part, carried out by credit institutions (banks). However, 
the provision of certain types of  payment services may be carried on, at least in some 
Member States, by other institutions (e.g. postal banks). It is considered right that the 
same minimum standards of performance set out in the directive should apply also 
to these other institutions. 
The directive does not apply to institutions to the extent that they do  not normally 
offer their services to the public, e.g.  central banks offering their services to credit 
institutions (see also definitions at Article 2 below). 
Article 2 
(e)  The definition of "payment" is based on that drawn up by the Committee on Payment 
and Settlement Systems of the central banks of the Group of Ten countries, with an 
addition to make it clear that' a movement of  funds by one person, from one  account 
of his  to another account of his, is included in the definition of payment. 
'  . 
(f)  In  order for payments to come within the scope of the directive,  there must be a 
cross-border  dimension.  The  cross-border  dimension  clearly  exists  where  the 
institutions of  the originating and the receiving parties are in different Member States. 
(i)  The Directive is intended to benefit "customers", whether these be the originator or 
the beneficiary, or both, as the context may require. Its general thrust in so doing is 
to provide that each institution in the payment chain is responsible to the party which 
instructed it. 
G)  The scope of the directive is limited to payments which are not made by means of 
personal face to face contact between the payer and the payee, present together at the 
place where the instrument of payment is used. 
(k)  "Credit transfers" are a means of remote cross-border payment, consisting of a series 
of operations, the initiative for which comes from the originating party and his bank. 
They are, in banking terms, distinguished from debit transfers (cheques, direct debits 
etc.) where the sum is "collected" by the receiving party's bank. Debit transfers are 
not within the scope of the directive, due to the important differences in the roles of 
the parties to debit transfers and in the parties' rights and responsibilities. 
21 (10) 
(11) 
(1) 
(m) 
(o) 
(p) 
"Force majeure" is based on the definition used in the Council  directive relating to 
package holidays<
10>.  Additionally, for the purpose of  this directive, it does not include 
the insolvency of an intermediary bank due to the particular need for protection of 
customers. Such a risk cannot be assessed or controlled by the customer, who does 
not choose the intermediary bank. 
Some  accounts  are  "interest"  bearing  for  customers  and  in  this  case  there  will 
necessarily be a rule applied by each customer's institution for determining the date 
from  which interest will  run on  sums posted  to the account.  Where this is not the 
case, the test to be applied is that of availability of funds, i.e.  the date on which the 
customer may freely withdraw the funds from his account. The definition takes into 
account the different rates of interest applicable for different periods, e.g.  overnight 
rates or rates for longer periods. 
An  institution is not obliged under ·the  directive to give effect to a payment order 
unless and until it has "accepted"  the order.  One important pre-condition for  such 
acceptance will generally be that its customer must have a sufficient credit balance 
on his account to pay for the remote cross-border payment which he has ordered, or 
alternatively that an agreed credit facility is in place.  The term  "financial cover" is 
intended to cover these alternatives. 
In the domestic payment systems of several Member States a credit transfer is not 
legally completed until the funds have been credited to the account of  the beneficiary; 
the definition of completion stops slightly short of the rule just cited. Responsibility 
for any further delays in crediting the amount of  the credit transfer to the beneficiary 
or for a failure within the beneficiary's bank occurring after acceptance, as defined, 
is a matter between the beneficiary and his bank. Similarly, the responsibility of the 
beneficiary's bank in  respect of the obligation  to execute  in  accordance  with the 
payment order is  .. a 'matter between the beneficiary and his bank. 
Article 3 
The  information  requirements  set  out  in  this  Article  follow  very  closely  the· Industry 
Guidelines<
11>  issued  on  a  voluntary  basis  in  1992  by  the  European  Credit  Sector 
Associations  (ECSA's).  Those  were,  in  turn,  based  on  the  requirements  expressed  by 
consumer and other user group representatives in consultation with the Commission in its 
Payment Systems Users Liaison Group. 
The EC Council Directive provides for the following definition:  "Force majeure: unusual 
and unforeseeable circumstances beyond the control of  the party by whom it  is pleaded, the 
consequences  of which  could  not  have  been  avoided  even  if all  due  care  had  been 
exercised" (90/314/EEC- OJ No L 158,  13.6.1990). 
"European Banking Industry Guideline.; on Customer Information on Cross-border Remote 
Payments"  of 2  March  1992  drawn  up  by  the  Banking  Federation  of the  EC,  the 
European Savings Banks Grou~ and the Association of Cooperative Banks of the EC. 
22 Article 4 
The information requirement set out in this Article covers the ex post information which 
customers require, e.g. by way of  a statement, a separate information slip, etc., subsequent 
to their making or receiving, as appropriate, a cross-border credit transfer. 
Article 5 
Very few credit transfers are handled entirely by one institution. Moreover, unlike payments 
in the domestic systems of most Member States, which run to strict rules including time 
scales,  many credit transfers are made between banks which have no such arrangements 
between them.  This Article is designed to both re-inforce and underpin the published or 
agreed time scale agreed by the institution, by promoting the following principle. Unless 
the institution has clearly informed ·its customer of a different period (e.g. in its literature, 
on the payment order form  etc.), the contractual time scale will  in effect become 5 days, 
maximum, for completion of  the payment. The institution of  the beneficiary shall place the 
funds  at  the  disposal  of the  beneficiary  at  the  latest  by  the  end  of the  business  day 
following acceptance of the payment order. 
The  Article  fills  the  lacunae  between  the  comparable  payment  systems  within  the 
Member States, which run to strict rules on time scales, and the small - although growing - · 
number of contractual credit transfer schemes between groups of  banks which already have 
contractual  rules  on  timing.  Existing· and  future  contractual  arrangements  will  not  be 
affected by the Article, provided that the transparency obligations towards the customer are 
respected.  · 
The originator's compensation for late payment is limited to ;_nterest from the latest date by 
which the payment should have been completed. Consequential losses are not recoverable 
under the directive, but this is without prejudice to the claims which might be upheld under 
domestic laws. 
23 \ 
Article 6 
This Article is aimed at instances where instructions by the originator, in respect of  charges, 
are not correctly carried out. This gives rise to a phenomenon, common known as "double 
charging".  These  problems arise  when  a  credit  transfer,  having  been  ordered  by  the 
originator on the basis that he would pay all associated fees - so that the beneficiary would 
receive  100%  of the  payment  amount  - is  further  charged  with  fees  en  route  to the 
beneficiary's account. Bankers are agreed that this is wrong, but are faced with the difficulty 
that in  many instances a bank has little knowledge of or control  over the practices of all 
the banks with which it must deal in order to effect a credit transfer. 
The rule is intended to underpin the attempts currently being made by the banking industry 
to eliminate the practice, which causes serious disturbance to the trading relations of its 
business customers and understandable inconvenience and expense to consumer customers. 
The customer's instructions about charges are, under existing international banking practice, 
normally recorded on the face of a credit transfer by the expression "BEN" for a transfer 
where all  fees in respect of the credit transfer are to be deducted from  the amount due to 
the beneficiary, or "SHA" for one where the paying customer shares the burden of fees, by 
paying those of his own bank leaving the fees  of other banks to be deducted  from  the 
amount due to the beneficiary. A credit transfer where all fees are for the account of the 
originator generally bears the description "OUR". This will, under the directive, become the 
rule on which an institution must fall  back if its customer has not given an instruction to 
the contrary. The onus will be on the institutions to ascertain the customer's instruction and 
to correctly incorporate it in the payment order. 
Charges which have been deducted without authority are to be refunded. The originator's 
bank is responsible for  .  .the correct execution of the payment order up to acceptance by the 
beneficiary's bank of the 'related funds, which is defined as completion. Where deductions 
occur beyond this point, i.e. within the beneficiary's bank, the beneficiary's bank becomes 
responsible.  The directive provides for a mechanism whereby the originator may,  at his 
choice, direct the refunded amount to the beneficiary.  Whether the originator decides to 
avail  himself of this  option will  depend  on  a  number of factors,  such  as  the particular 
nature of the underlying contractual relations between the originator and the beneficiary. 
24 Article 7 
This Article provides each party to a credit transfer with an important right, in cases where 
transfers are badly delayed or "lost" in the system. The customer claims from his institution, 
which in turn claims on the institution which it had instructed (as its agent) to forward 'the 
transfer. There is a strict liability for payments under 10.000 ECU in value. A bank may 
however derogate from  this in respect of events of "force majeure". This liability appears 
justified for three main reasons: 
the  customer  himself  has  no  rights,  or  no  effective  rights,  against  any  of the 
intermediary institutions used to make the transfer; he will generally not even be aware 
of their identities; 
the  originator's  institution  has  generally  selected  the institutions through  whom  the 
transfer will  pass,  or at  least the first  such  institution;  the originator's  institution  is 
therefore  in  a  position  to exercise  competitive  pressure  in  the  market  by  selecting 
reliable intermediary institutions; 
the  originator will  have  paid  his  institution  a  fee  for  the transfer of his  funds.  If, 
contrary to his legitimate expectations, the funds do not arrive, he should as a minimum 
be entitled to their return, under the principle of safe custody. 
In a commercial setting, an originator whose payment becomes lost will often find himself 
facing  a  claim  for interest from  his  beneficiary,  whose  due  date  for payment may  have 
passed.  As  a  reasonable  flat  rate  compensation  the  Article provides for the payment  of 
interest.  The burden of this interest payment will however, under the "chain"  principle of 
credit transfers, ultimately fall on the institution responsible for the delay or loss, unless that 
institution has become insolvent (in which case the burd.en rests with the originator's bank). 
It should  be added  that the institution  responsible for  the delay  may  also have  had  the 
opportunity to benefit from  the "float"  attached  to the delayed funds,  so that there is an 
element of restitution applicable to the interest penalty. 
The principle of the right to refund, substantially as set out in this Article (but without the 
possibility of derogation),  has recently been recommended to its member governments by 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law and has been enacted in the laws 
governing the major payment systems of the United States, for domestic and international 
credit transfers. 
25 Proposal for a . 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL  DIRECTIVE 
on cross-border credit transfers 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article lOOa 
.. thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Monetary Institute, 
In accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 189b of the Treaty, 
Whereas the volume of remote cross-border payments is growing steadily as the completion of 
the internal market and the progressive move towards full economic and monetary union lead to 
greater trade flows and movement of people throughout the Community; whereas cross-border 
credit transfers account for a substantial part of  the volume and the value of remote cross-border 
payments; 
Whereas it is of paramount importance for individuals and businesses to be able to make credit 
transfers rapidly,  reliably, and cheaply from  one part of the Community to another; whereas a 
market in which there is competition for cross-border credit transfers should lead to improved 
services and reduced prices; 
Whereas this Directive intends to follow up the progress towards the liberalization of capital 
movements reached during stage  I of economic and monetary union;  whereas it takes account 
of the purpose of facilitating the use of the ECU set out in the Treaty; whereas it is conceived 
as a step towards the progressive implementation of economic and monetary union; whereas its-
provisions should apply to credit transfers in any currency, including the ECU; 
27 Whereas this Directive is intended to implement one aspect oftheprogramme of work drawn up 
by the Commission following its Green Paper "Making payments in the internal  market"; 
Whereas the Commission has recommended to  Member State that the threshold below which 
cross-border  payments  should  not  have  to  be  reported  should  be  fixed  at  not  less  than 
ECU 10 000; 
Whereas the Committee of Governors of the central banks of the Member States recommended 
that  payment  systems  in  all  Member  States  should  have  a  sound  legal  basis;  whereas  the 
Commission has  set up  a ·working group on  the  legal  framework for  cross-border payments, 
which consists of legal experts of governments and of the EMI; whereas this group has advised 
-the Commission that the issues covered by this Directive may be dealt with separately from the 
systemic issues which remain under consideration; whereas it may be necessary to make a further 
proposal to cover these systemic issues, principally settlement finality; 
Whereas the purpose of  this Directive is to improve cross-border credit transfer services and thus 
assist the EMI in its task of promoting the efficiency of cross-border payments with a view to 
the preparation of the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union; 
28 Whereas,  having regard to the third paragraph of Article 3b of the  Treaty, this Directive lays 
down the minimum requirements needed to ensure an  adequate level  of customer information;  I 
whereas  greater  transparency  is  ultimately  dependent  on  institutions'  adherence to minimum 
performance  requirements;  whereas  this  Directive  lays  down  the  minimum  performance 
requirements which institutions offering cross-border credit transfer services should adhere to; 
whereas  this  Directive  fulfils  the  first,  second,  third,  fourth  and  fifth  principles  set  out  in 
Commission  Recommendation  90/1 09/EEC(I>;  whereas  it  is  without  prejudice  to  Council 
Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991  on prevention of the use of the financial  system for the 
purpose of inoney launderingC2>; 
Whereas  the  nature  of cross-border  credit  transfers,  being  a  series  of operations  involving 
··institutions in different Member States, is such that a coordinated approach at Community level 
is  appropriate  and  necessary;  whereas  a  self-regulatory  approach  has been  attempted  by  the 
Commission  by  its  Recommendation 90/109/EEC;  whereas  this  voluntary  approach  has  not 
achieved the desired results; whereas a binding measure is therefore appropriate; 
Whereas this Directive should  apply to credit transfers for  any  amount;  whereas institutions 
should be under an  obligation to refund in the case of a non-completed transfer;  whereas the 
obligation to refund imposes a contingent liability on institutions which might, if  the possibility 
were  not  given  to  exclude  high-value  transfers,  have  a  prudential  effect  on  the  solvency 
requirement; whereas the possibility of derogation (by Member States and, if so exercised, by 
institutions) from this obligation  should be provided only in the case of high-value payments of 
more than ECU  10 000;  whereas  this  threshold  does  not  apply  to any  other Article  of this 
Directive; 
(I) 
(2) 
OJ No L 67,  15.3.1990, p.  39. 
OJ No L  166, 28.6.1991, p.  77. 
29 Whereas  the  European  Parliament,  in  its  Resolution  of  12  February  1993,  called  for  a 
Council Directive to lay down rules in the area of  transparency and perfonnance of cross-border 
payments; 
Whereas the Economic and Social Committee, in its Opinion of 6 July 1994, stated a preference 
for  a code of good  conduct;  whereas the Commission has  previously  pursued this approach; 
whereas the Economic and Social Committee advised that, if a directive were to be proposed, it 
should be limited to setting out a general framework; whereas this Directive follows this model, 
by allowing a large measure of freedom of contract; 
··HAVE ADOPTED TIDS DIRECTIVE: 
30 SECTION I 
Scope and definitions 
Article  1 
Scope 
1.  Member States shall  apply the requirements of this Directive to credit institutions and  to 
other institutions which supply credit transfer sez-Vices to the public as part of  their business. 
2.  This Directive shall apply to credit transfers in any currency, including the ECU, and for any 
amount save where the derogation in Article 7(3) has been exercised. 
Article  2 
Definitions 
For the purpose of this Directive: 
(a)  "credit institution"  shall  mean  an  institution as  defined in Article  I  of Council  Directive 
77/780/EEC<J>;  for the purposes of this Directive, branches of credit institutions in different 
Member States are deemed to be separate institutions; 
(b)  "other institution" shall mean any legal person, other than a credit institution, that  supplies 
to the public, by way of business,  credit transfer services  ~ 
(c)  "institUtion" shall mean a credit institution or other institution; 
(d)  "person" shall mean either a legal or a natural person, as the context may require; 
(e)  "payment" shall mean the transfer by an originator of  a monetary claim on a party acceptable 
to the beneficiary, including cases where the originator and the  beneficiary are the same 
person~ 
(3)  OJ No L 322, 17.12.1977, p.  30. 
31 (f)  "cross-border payment" shall mean a payment by an originator whose account, from which 
the·payment is made, is held by an institution or its branch in one Member State, to be made 
available to a beneficiary at an institution or its branch in another Member State; 
(g)  "originator"  shall  mean  a  person  that  authorizes  the  making  of a  cr~dit transfer  to  a 
beneficiary; 
(h)  "beneficiary" shall  mean the final  recipient of a credit transfer; 
(i)  "customer" shall mean the originator or the beneficiary, as the context may require, and may 
be one and the same person; 
(j)  "payment order" shall mean an instruction in any form, given direct to an institution, to place 
at the disposal of a beneficiary a fixed or determinable amount of money. 
(k)  "credit transfer"  shall  mean  a  cross-border payment,  consisting of a  series of operations 
beginning with the originator's payment order. The term includes any payment order issued 
by  the  originator's  institution or  any  intermediary  institution  intended to  carry  out  the 
originator's payment order; 
(I)  "force majeure"  shall  not include the  insolvency  of an  intermediary  institution but shall 
otherwise  have  the  meaning  ascribed  to  it  in  indent (ii)  of the  second  subparagraph  of 
Article 4(6) of Council Directive 90/314/EEC<
4>; 
(m) "interest" shall mean the inter-bank offered rate, in<;reased by two percentage points, in the 
relevant market for deposits in the currency of any 'given payment, calculated for the period 
of the delay; 
(n)  "value date" shall mean the date on which the customer's account is debited (for originators) 
or credited (for beneficiaries) such date being that applied by the institution of the customer 
for the purpose of calculating interest (if any) on the account or assessing the availability of 
funds, where interest is not an appropriate criterion; 
OJNoL 158,  23.6.1990, p.  59. 
32 (o)  "acceptance"  shall  mean  the  acceptance  by  an  institution  of a  payment  order,  upon 
fulfilment of the institution's conditions as  to the availability  of financial  cover and the 
identification of  the parties named in the payment order and any other pre-conditions agreed 
by the parties; 
(p). "completion" of a credit transfer shall .,mean acceptance by the beneficiary's institution; 
(q)  "intermediary institution" shall mean an institution which is neither that of  the originator nor 
that of the beneficiary;  · 
(r)  "business day" in relation to any particular institution shall mean a day, or part of  a day, on 
which that institution is open for the processing of credit transfers. 
SECTION II 
Transparency of conditions for credit transfers 
Article 3 
Information prior to a credit transfer (made or received) 
The institution shall  supply its customers with  clear written information about the  services it 
provides to effect or receive credit transfers.  This information shall include: 
an  indication  of the  time  needed  for  the  funds  to  be  credited  to  the  account  of the 
beneficiary's institution or to the beneficiary, as appropriate; 
the basis of the calculation of any commissions and charges payable by the customer to the 
institution; 
the value date, if  ~ny, applicable b¥ the institution; 
a reference to the redress procedures available to the customer and the method of gaining 
access to them. 
33 Article 4 
Information subsequent to a credit transfer (made or received) 
The institution  shall  supply  its  customers with  clear written information  subsequent  to their 
making or receiving a credit transfer. This information shall at least include:  · 
a reference enabling its customer t.o  identify the payment; 
the amount of any charges payable by its customer. Where the originator has authorized a 
deduction from the amount of  a credit transfer, this fact and the original amount of  the credit 
transfer should be stated by the beneficiary's bank  to the beneficiary; 
the value date, if any, applied by the institution. 
SECTION III 
Minimum obligations of institutions  in respect of credit transfers 
Article 5 
Obligation to execute in good time 
1.  Each institution having accepted a payment order shall  execute the related credit transfer 
within the time scale agreed with the customer (or institution) making the payment order. 
In the absence of a  specific agreement as to the time scale,  the institution shall  act soon 
enough to ·enable its published clear time scale to be achieved.  Where there is neither a 
specific  agreement  nor an applicable published time scale, the following obligations shall 
apply: 
- the institution of  the originator shall be responsible to the originator for ensuring that the 
credit transfer is completed no later than the end of the fifth  business day  following 
acceptance by it of the payment order from the originator; and 
34 - the institution of  the beneficiary shall be obliged to place the amount of  the credit transfer 
at the disposal of the beneficiary, at the latest by the end of the business day  following 
completion of the credit transfer. 
2.  The originator's institution shall compensate the originator by the payment of interest on 
the amount of the credit transfer where it is  completed late,  but shall  not be liable for 
consequential  losses under this Directive.  No compensation shall  be payable where the 
originator's bank can establish that the delay was attributable to the originator. 
3.  In addition to the obligation of execution in paragraph 1, the beneficiary's institution shall 
compensate the beneficiary by the payment of  interest on the amount of the credit transfer 
where it is late in being placed at the beneficiary's disposal. 
Article 6 
Obligation to execute in accordance with the instructions 
contained in  the payment order 
1.  The originator's institution,  any  intennediary institution and the beneficiary's institution, 
once they have accepted the payment order,  shall each be obliged to execute the related 
. credit transfer for the full amount thereof unless authorized to make a deduction therefrom. 
Without  prejudice  to  the  duty  not  to  deduct,  the  beneficiary's  institution  may,  where 
appropriate, levy an additional charge on the beneficiary relating to the administration of 
his account. However, any such additional administrative charge shall not exceed the charge 
that would be made for a domestic credit transfer. 
35 2.  Where a breach of the duty to execute in accordance with the payment order as described 
in .paragraph 1 has been caused by any institution other than the beneficiary's institution, 
and  without  prejudice to any  other claim  which  might be made,  the  institution of the 
originator shall  be liable to credit to the originator any  sum  wrongly  deducted by  any 
institution,  at  its own cost.  Alternatively,  if required to do  so by  the  originator it shall 
transfer such amount to the credit of the beneficiary, free of  all deductions, .at its own cost. 
Any intermediary institution making a deduction in breach of the duty in paragraph 1 shall 
be liable to credit the sum so deducted  to the institution of the originator. Alternatively, 
if required by  the institution of the originator,  it shall  transfer such  amount,  free of all 
deductions, to the credit of the beneficiary, at its own cost. 
·3.  Where a breach of the duty to execute in  accordance with the payment order has been 
caused by the beneficiary's institution, and without prejudice to any other claim which may 
be made, the beneficiary's institution shall be liable to credit to the beneficiary, at its own 
cost, any sum wrongly deducted. 
Article 7 
Obligation of institutions to refund in case of non-completed credit transfers 
1.  If, after a payment order has been accepted by the originator's institution, the related credit 
transfer is not for any reason  completed, and without prejudice to any other claim which 
may be made,  the originator is entitled to have his account credited on demand with the 
full  amount of the credit transfer plus interest and the amount of the charges for the non-
completed credit transfer, such demand to be madf not earlier than 20 business days after 
the  date  on  which the  credit transfer should  have  been  completed.  Each intermediary 
institution which has accepted the payment order likewise owes an obligation to refund at 
its own cost the amount of the credit transfer to the institution which instructed it. 
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2.  If the non-completion of the credit transfer was caused by defective instructions given by 
the originator to his institution, the originator's institution and the other institutions involved 
shall use their best endeavours to make the refund referred. to in paragraph 1. 
3.  Member States may  allow institutions to  derogate  by  contract  from  the obligation  to 
refund, as described in paragraph 1,  in the following cases: 
where the non-completion of the credit transfer is due to force majeure; or 
for payments above ECU 10 000. 
SECTION IV 
Final Provisions 
Article  8 
Implementation 
I.  Member' States shall bring into force the laws,  regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with this Directive before 31  December 1996 at the latest. They shall 
forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
When  Member  States  adopt .  these  provisions,  these  shall  contain  a  reference  to  this 
Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference at the time of  their official publication. 
The procedure for such reference shall be adopted by Member States. 
....  ·\  ' 
37 2.  Member States shall  communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of 
national  law  which  they  adopt  in  the  field  governed  by  this  Directive.  In  this 
Communication  Member  States  shall  provide  a  table  of correspondence  showing  the 
national provisions which exist or are introduced in respect of each article of  this Directive. 
Article  9 
Report to-the European Parliament and the Council 
No  later  than  31  December  1999,  the  Commission  shall  present  a  report  to  the 
.. European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive, accompanied where 
appropriate by proposals for its revision. 
Article 10 
Entry into force 
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities. 
Article 11 
Addressees 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the European Parliament 
The President 
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For the Council 
The President BUSINESS IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
Proposal for a 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL DffiECTIVE 
on cross-border credit transfers  ...,. ____________ _ 
l.a.  Taking  account  of the  principle  of subsidiarity,  why  is  Community  legislation 
necessary and what are its main aims? 
In order to reap the full benefits of the single market and Economic and Monetary Union, 
it is of  paramount importance for individuals and businesses to be able to make payments 
as rapidly, reliably and cheaply from one part of the Union to another as is now the case 
for payments within the Member States with the most efficient nationat·payment systems. 
The purpose of  the present proposal is first of all to lay down the minimum requirements 
needed to ensure an adequate level of customer information. Firstly, this covers the ex-
ante information about the various possibilities open to users  for sending funds across 
frontiers,  which  will  enable  them  to  make  a  better  informed  choice  and  ultimately 
contribute to the overall  efficiency of cross-border payments by  ·~xerting  ·a downward 
pressure on prices. Information also needs to be given in respect of  cross-border payments 
after they  have been made.  In order to ensure that institutions are able to perform in 
accordance with  the  transparency  conditions,  minimum  standards of performance are 
required, given the large n~mber of such institutions within the Union. 
Therefore, the present proposal also sets out such minimum standards of performance, as 
are deemed necessary in· view of the abovementioned fundamental objective. 
Considering the cross-border nature of the payments in question,  legislation at national 
level  would not suffice unless it were adopted  in a  substantively  similar way in each 
Member State. The most efficient way of achieving the aims set out above is by way of 
directive laying down the necessary minimum standards. 
l.b.  Are there likely to be any wider benefits and disadvantages from the proposal? 
(I) 
The  process ·of implementing  these  transparency  and  performance  requirements  is 
expected to require institutions to review their systems for making cross-border payments 
and therefore to bring about greater efficiencies. At the same time, customers will be in 
a position to make a well-founded choice between different services offered as well  as 
between different institutions. These factors are likely to contribute to a progressive and 
significant  reduction  in  the  cost  of making  cross-border  payments,  equalling  in  the 
medium/long term an estimated minimum-of ECU 10 billion per year0 >,  presently borne 
The 1994 •tudy ~ed  ou\ by the Commi55ion indicates that the average total cost of a I 00 ECU CTOSS·border credit twufc"t is 2~. ECU. However, I 00 ECU may be considered 
as a rel•tively low value for a credit tJon<f<r, and thu.< likely to haye attracted the minimtun charge applicable to such transactions. The European Credit S.ctor AS5ociatioJU have 
remarked that more typical truuactioJU are those for an average amount ofat lea_<tl  500 ECU. It is believed that cross-border credit twufers in this latter value range would attract 
.  a higher charge, which may prudently be estiltlllted at approximately 30 ECU. This compares with an average charge for comp&rable domestic twufers rarely exceeding 2 ECU 
(if  charged at all). Figur"' for  1991  indicate  l~e volwne of  cross·bord.:r credit transf.:rs at 117.6 rrillion A prudent estimate of  the mediurnllong  tenn volwne of  such twufen 
has been made on the basis cfthe yearly increment ever the period 1989-1991 (in excess of  I~%  per OMurn), IS well u  taking into account the increase in EC SWIFT me,..ges 
over the period  1991-1993 (cat.  I, customer twufcrs). On the usumption that the ref.:rence rate of  increment would hold unchanged, it can prudently be estimated that in the 
rnediurnllong  term, i.e. over the next five  yeors leading up \o the year 2000, the volume of  eross-border eredit twufers will increase by approximately  IOOo/o, thus reaching a 
minimum  3~6 million credit twufers. Thus, the combined increase in the volume cf  cross-border credittwufen IS well as the reduction in the cost asrociated with them lead 
to an estimated welfare gain of 9 968 billion ECU 
39 by  businesses  and  final  consumers.  The  present  cost  (average  of ECU  25.4  for  the 
smallest payments, i.e.  100 ECU credit transfers) is a disincentive to trade, particularly 
with  respect  to  lower-value  and  lower-margin  intra-EU  economic  activity,  and 
consequently  represents  an  obstacle  to  higher  employment,  particularly  in  the  SMEs 
segment. 
The process of rationalisation of cross-border payment systems might give nse to some 
redundancies in the payment systems industry, in particular the banking sector.  This is 
however expected to be balanced by the creation of a number of new jobs related to the 
introduction of  new technology, innovative and value-added services in the industry. The 
risk of redundancies within the payment systems industry will be further attenuated by 
the consequent increase in the volume of business that enhanced efficiency, and therefore 
greater transparency,  will  stimulate  (more  efficient  payment  services  ... widening  of 
intra-EU trade potential - contribution to growth and higher employment - greater and 
more specialized demand for efficient payment services, etc.). 
l.c.  Were  alternative  proposals  considered,  and  with  what  outcome  (e.g.  codes  of 
conduct, voluntary arrangements)? 
Yes. In 1990, the Commission adopted Recommendation 90/109/EEC<
2>,  which contained 
principles  on  minimum  standards  relating  to  the  performance  of cr<;>ss-border  credit 
transfers. In 1991, the Commission worked with representatiyes of  the European Banking 
Industry, the distributive trades, SMEs and consumers, with a view to finding appropriate 
voluntary  solutions  to  the  problems  dealt ·with  in  the  present· directive.  Subsequent 
research {1992, 1993 and 1994) has indicated that on relevant aspects (i.e. those contained 
in this proposal), insufficient progress has been made. 
2.  Who will be affected by the proposal? 
(2) 
Which  sector  of  business?  What  are  the  size  classes  and  what  is  the  total 
employment? 
The proposal will be applicable to banks and any other institutions which supply credit 
transfer  services to the public by way of business. In practice, the large majority of  these 
will be banks and near-banks. Very few such institutions are in the lower size-classes. 
Are there any significant features of the business sector, e.g. dominance by a limited 
number of large firms? 
The main feature of the sector is the lack of integration of payment systems at European 
level, which is one of the principal causes of the high cost, the inefficiencies and lack of 
transparency which the current proposal addresses. A contributory element to the lack of 
investment  directed  at  further  integration  may  be  the  relatively  low .  volume  of 
Recmnmendation  on  the  transparency· of banking  conditions  relating  to  cross-border 
financial transactions (OJ No L 67,  15.3.1990, p.  39). 
40 cross-border credit  transfers  by  comparison  with  the  total  volume of domestic  credit 
transfers(3).  However, the high  cost,  the inefficiencies and the lack of transparency of 
credit transfer services may in tum be regarded as an obstacle and therefore a contributory 
cause of these relatively low volumes. 
Are there implications for very small businesses, the craft sector or the self-employed? 
Very  small  businesses  arc  very  unlikely  to be  offering  credit transfer services  to the  public. 
However, as beneficiaries of  the proposal, i.e. as users of  credit transfer services, they will benefit 
from  the proposal  to the  extent that  they  engage  in  cross-border trade.  These  remarks  apply 
equally to the craft sector and the self-employed, who will not be in a position to offer credit 
transfer services, but will be beneficiaries of  the proposal as users. 
Arc there particular geographical areas in the Community where these businesses arc located? 
No. 
3.  What will businesses have to do to comply with the proposal? 
(1) 
What will be the compliance costs? 
Compliance costs will mainly relate to the production, or up-grading as appropriate, and printing 
of information  material  describing  the  conditions  applicable  to  cross-border  credit  transfers 
(description of  the different means available, indication of  the cost elements, indication of  the time 
scale  for  execution of payments, specific warnings with regard to certain means of payment, 
reference to redress procedures available to users). Institution will also need to review the quality 
of  the systems to ensure that the quality of  the services they publicise is effectively matched by 
the actual quality of service. This review will help institutions to identify and eliminate internal 
inefficiencies, thus significantly contributing to  the progressive lowering of the cost of service 
production and, consequently,the break-even point by reference to which to decide their charging 
policy vis-a-vis users.  · 
The cost of  this will probably be partially or even wholly offset by the marketing benefits likely 
to result, as institutions learn to build a competitive advantage on the qualitative standards of  the 
credit transfer services  they provide, as  a way of attracting new or specialized customers,  in 
particular SMEs. 
Are there other administrative procedures or forms to complete? 
No. 
Are licenses or marketing authorizations required? 
No. 
Will fees  be charged? 
No. 
.  EC Danking Federation, Annual Report, 1992; In  1991, the volume of cross-border payments represented 1,27% of  the total volume 
of·ull non-cash payments.  Cross-border credit transfers accounted  for  29,S% (i.e.  117,6 million) of the  volume of cross-border 
payments. However, the value of a cross-border payment is  on average significantly higher than the average value of comparable 
domestic payments. 
41 4.  What economic effects, costs and benefits is the proposal likely to have? 
(4) 
On employment? 
Within the  payment systems  industry,  the  net  effect  is  considered to  be  very  limited, if not 
positive. Within the segment of  SMEs, employment benefits are expected to be significant (more 
efficient payment services - widening of intra-EU trade potential - contribution to growth and 
higher employment -greater and more specialized demand for efficient payment services, etc.). 
See para.  1.b. 
On investment and the creation or start up of new businesses? 
· The investment effect will  no  doubt be  positive,  as  institutions may  be  expected to take the 
opportunity to upgrade their services. The welfare gain referred to in para. 1 (in the mediumnong-
term, at least 10 billion ECU per annum) will release considerable resources for investment and 
new business creation. 
On the competitive position  of businesses,  both  in  the Community and third  countries' 
markets? 
The efficiency gains and reductions in costs for business within the Community will be extremely 
positive  (See  paras.  1 and 4 above).  There will  be  no direct effect on third country business, 
although positive spill-over effects may be anticipated. 
On public authorities for implementation? 
Beyond the purely legislative costs of  passing the necessary domestic legislation, implementation 
costs may be negligible depending on the present stat~  of  the law in the Member State concerned. 
Are there other indirect effects? 
Not other than already stated in paras.  1 and 2. 
What are the costs and benefits of the proposal? 
•  costs: the cost of  compliance for institutions is expected to have no exorbitant effect on the 
publicity budget, since compliance will mainly involye the production, or up-grading as 
appropriate, of informative material. As to the necessary review of  systems, the scope for 
cost elimination is  expected to outweigh the investment costs that such a  review might 
determine to be necessary. 
•  benefits: in its 1992 working document<
4>, the Commission indicated that aboot 50% of  the 
estimated 400 million cross-border payments fell  below a 2 500 ECU threshold. On this 
basis, it underlined the importance of  early action to bring the petformance of  cross-border 
payment systems up to the standard of  the best national systems. 
"Easier cross-border payments: breaking down the barriers":  SEC(92) 621  of 27 March · 
1992. 
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Taking· account of the most important present and  prospective elements (gradual 
completion  of the  Internal  Market  programme,  move  towards full  EMU),  gross 
benefits  in  terms  of lower  costs  for  credit  transfers  have  been  conservatively 
estimated, in the medium/long term, at a minimum of 10 billion ECU per annum. 
balance: overwhelmingly positive on the benefit side . 
5.  Impact on SMEs. Does the proposal contain measures to take account of the specific 
effect  on  SMEs  - if  not,  why  not?  Are  reduced  or  different  requirements 
appropriate? 
Yes.  The  proposal  lays  down  the  possibility  for  institutions ,to  determine  their  own 
performance obligations. The one performance obligation which,cannot be contracted ~ut 
of,  i.e.  the  obligation  to  refund  lost  or  failed  payments,  will  benefit  SMEs ·to  a 
proportibmitely  larger extent than  large businesses,  as  the value  ceiling for  payments 
covered  by  it  is  relatively  small  (10.000  ECU).  As  might  be  expected,  SMEs.have 
expressed a preference for the removal of this value ceiling: However, the Commission 
believes  that,  at  the  level  set,  the  threshold  affords  SMEs  a  reasonably  appropriate 
coverage without having any significant prudential impact on  the banking sector. 
Could there be higher thresholds which would exclude SMEs without threatening the 
effect of the regulation? 
Not applicable, since the only threshold contained in the present proposal (10.000 ECU) 
defines the beneficiaries of the directive.  Conversely,  there is no  qualifying threshold 
defined  in  terms of size  of business.  Such  would not be appropriate  for  the reasons 
already given to the previous question under item s: 
Consultation 
6.  Indicate at what stage the consultations were undertaken and the date of publication 
of the prior notification of an intent to introduce legislation? 
(S) 
The Commission has, over many years, promoted the fullest consultation of  all interested 
parties and earliest disclosure of its line of policy in this area.  This has materialised in 
the following steps: 
Green Paper<S> (consultation paper) of September 1990, calling for comments from 
all  interested  parties~ annexed  to the  Green  Paper was  a decision to set up two 
consultative groups~ 
setting up  of two  permanent  consultative groups  on  payment  systems  in  March 
1991, with intensive frequency of  meetings throughout 1991 and early 1992, leading 
to reports to the Commission (in February 1992) published in March  1992~ 
Discussion paper on "Making payments in the Internal Market", COM(90)447. 
43 Commission working documen.t of March  1992<
6>,  based on  ~he detailed reports of . 
these consultative groups, announcing the Commission's proposed policy, inCluding 
int'ent to introduce legislation if voluntary compliance was not for,1h-coming; 
communicationC1> from Mr Vanni d'Archirafi and Mrs Scrivener tp the Commission 
of December  1993,  noting  the  lack  of progress,  recording the  comments  of all 
interested parties (consumers,  SMEs,  distribution trade,  banks,  central banks) on 
necessary follow-up measures; 
decision of  the Commission laid down in this communication to undertake 'a second 
(and  definitive)  detailed  monitoring  exercise in  the  second  half of 1994  and  to 
introduce legislation if  the results were not satisfactory; issuing of  a first project for 
a proposal of a directive, attached to the said communication, to be discussed with 
all·interested parties as well as withgoverriment experts, with a view to amending 
it in readiness for its adoption should this have proved to be necessary, in the light 
of the second study results. 
List of organizations which have been consulted about the proposal and set out in detail 
their main views, including their concerns and objections to the final proposal. Why is  it 
not possible or desirable to accede their concerns? 
European credit sector associations: views range from strongly opposed to reluctant to resigned 
(some of their detailed technical commentaries have however been acceded to and are taken into 
.  account in the current proposal). 
Government experts: ad-hoc meetings on  the first draft directive. Mixed views, ranging from . 
opposed  to  enthusiastic.  The  first  draft  of a  proposal  for  a  directive  has  been  significantly 
amended to take account to the fullest extent possible of their det~iled views. 
SMEs: strongly in favour of the principle's but preferred self-regulation provided that its effects 
could have been measured in the short term (which they have not been). 
Consumer organizations: widest support to Commission's legislative intervention. 
For further details of views, see section III of  the Communication from Mr Vanni d'Archirafi and 
Mrs Scrivener to the Commission of December 1993. 
Were the SME Business Organizations formally consulted? If not, why not? 
Yes,  see immediately above. 
(6) 
(7) 
See footnote 4. 
"Transparency  and  performance  of  cross-border  payments";  SEC(93)  1968  of 
14 December 1993. 
44 Monitoring and Review 
7.  Explain how the effects and compliance costs of the proposal will be monitored 
reviewed. How will complaints be dealt with? Can the proposal, once it is legislation, 
be amended easily? 
The proposal contains in its Article 9 an undertaking on the part of the Commission to 
report  on  these  matters  to  the  European  Parliament  and  Council.  The  necessary 
preparation  for  this  will  be  done  by  the  Commission  acting  with  its  existing  two 
consultative groups on payment systems. 
There is no comitology procedure,  therefore amendments to the proposal,  once this is 
adopted, will  require normal legislative procedures.  ' 
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NOTICE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE EC COMPETITION RULES 
TO CROSS-BORDER CREDIT TRANSFER SYSTEMS 
1.  This notice sets out the  approach  the Commission intends to take when  assessing the 
compatibility of cross-border  credit'tran~fers systems with the competition rules of the 
EC Treaty. This document updates and replaces the "Principles on competition for credit 
transfer  systems"  contained  at  Annex C  of the  Commission  Working  Document  of 
27 March  1992<1>  •  • • 
2.  ~everal instruments can be used to make cross·border payments, including payment cards 
(charge cards, credit cards, debit cards and, in the near future,  pre-paid cards), cheques, 
and transfers (credit transfers and debit transfers, including direct debiting). Payments can 
either be made "face-to-face" or remotely. Competition poli'"Y is relevant to all  types of 
cross-border payment systems. This notice is, however, limited to credit transfer systems. 
3.  Although  payment systems,  including  credit transfer systems,  also  exist within  single 
Member States,  this  notice is limited to  systems in  so  far  as  they  carry  cross-border 
transfers.  Cross-border  systems  will  by  their  very  nature  affect  trade  betwe~n 
Member States. 
2.  Non-price competition 
4. 
(I) 
(2) 
(1) Membership in a  system~ 
The question  of in.embership  in  payment  systems has  to  ta~e into account  aspects of 
Community law other than the competition rules. In particular, where·systems are set up 
by legislation 'or guided by public authorities, the principles of freedom of establishment 
and freedom to provide serviccs·contained in the EC Treaty and in the Second Banking 
Directiye<
2> will be appiica~le. Those aspects of public regulation are. not dealt with in this 
document. 
SEC(92)621  "Easier cross-border payments: Breaking down the barriers". 
.  Second Council Directive· of 15 December 1989 on the coordination of laws, regulations 
and  administrative provisions relating to the taking up  and  pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions  (89/646/EEC), 1989 OJ L386/l. 
49' 5.  Private arrangements between banks setting up new or linking existing systems will have 
to comply with Articles 85  and 86 of the EC Treaty. 
6.  As a general  rule,  a system which constitutes an  "essential facility"  should be open for 
further  membership  (provided that  candidates  meet appropriate. criteria)  and  nmst not 
prevent individual members from.'taking part in other systems. Factors indicating that a 
system might be an essential facility include a high market share or a significant number 
of  participan~s. A system that does not have a significant position on the overall market 
may  be important for  particular types  of banks and  could also  constitute an  essential · 
facility for the types of bank in question.  · 
.. 7.  A payment system that constitutes an essential facility may apply membership criteria that 
are objectively justified. Criteria should be written and accessible. They can concern, for 
example,  the  financial  standing,  orderly  management  and  technical  capacities  of 
participants. 
8.  As regards criteria based on volume,  it will  be legitimate to require that the expected 
traffic generated by a candidate should not be negligible. But payment systems should 
wherever possible permit participation by banks of varying sizes. Thus, instead of basing 
a membership criterion simply on expected volume, it may often be preferable to make 
the candidate's own decision depend on economic considerations (for example, a high flat 
rate  contribution  representing  the  participation  in  previous  investments  by  other 
participants; however the share of the entrant must I}Ot  exceed a fair share of  .the actual 
cost  of past  investments).  Where foreign  banks  apply  for  membership  in  a  domestic 
transfer system, their expected volume may be !-ow in the beginning; in such cases the 
type of business, the experience and the volume of payment transactions in the country 
of origin of such banks should 'be· taken into account. 
9.  Refusal  of membership  or  exclusion  should  be  subject  to  an  independent  review 
procedure. 
10.  Members of a system which is not an essential facility (see paragraph ) are not obliged 
to open their system .to further members and ~ay  be capable of obtaining an exemption 
under  Article  85(3)  if they  prevent,  in  order  to  ensure  adequate volume,  individual 
. members from taking ·part in other systems.  · 
50 (2) Operation .of·a system 
11.  Bariks  withi~  .a  syst¢m ·can. agree  standard~ relating to  t~e:operation of  the system,  the 
· kirid ·and 'quality  of'  transactions tQ  be .processed by :the system, .and  security  and  risk 
.· mahagim1enf rules.  Ho~ever, s~ch agreements:·.  ·  . 
·(1)  must be .limited to iriter-bank relations and must not lead to concerted practices 
vis-a-vis customers; and 
(2)  must not lead to any exclusivitY arrangement: customers must remain free to change 
banking  connections  from  one  institution  to  another,  or  to  bank  with  several 
institutions simultaneously. 
.  12. .  Agreements on standards could include the following: 
I. 
(1)  .  ~greements on operational standards, including: 
standard.ized.  message formats  and. routing  identifiers. (but  agreements  on 
eligible hardware should be avoided); 
rules on transaction times, for example stipulating that value will be received 
by the beneficiary bank of a credit transfer by a certain deadline if  a payment 
order is received by a certain time (but such arrangements must, in particular, 
not lead to concerted value dating practices vis-a-vis customers); 
settlement arrangements, for example the modalities of how settlement is to 
be achieved, of agreeing settlement totals, and of agreeing the point at which 
settlement can be considered fin.al.  ,, 
(2)  where justified, agreements on transaction standards, including: 
maximum and minimum amounts to be processed by  a system; 
the  minimum  information  necessary  for  a  transfer to be sent  through  the 
system. 
(3)  agreements on security and risk management rules, including: 
criteria for the granting of settlement status and the management of settlement 
accounts; 
arrangements relating to liquidity  standards (for example,  a requirement to 
post sufficient collateral to cover exposures); 
prearranged sharing of losses from defaults of participants. 
51 3.  Price competition 
(I) Pricing vis-a-vis customers 
13.  Here, sin other areas of  banking competition, no agreements between participating banks 
on prices of transactions with their customers can be accepted. Any agreements affecting 
inter-bank relations must leave banks free to determine the offers which they can make 
and conditions they will apply their customers. 
(2) Costs of systems and central bodies 
·· 14.  The costs incurred by the setting up of a system and those arising out of the operation of 
a central  body (for example, an  ACH(
3>),  can be shared amongst participating banks by 
means of, for example, an ACH tariff (which might vary according to volumes or other 
pre-established conditions) charged to participating banks.  If setting up costs have been 
necessarily incurred by beneficiaries' banks, it might be justifiable to pay for those costs 
by means of a collectively agreed interchange fee (as to which,  see below). 
15. 
{3) 
{4) 
(3) Interchange fees in  multilateral systems 
(a)  Indispensability 
The remainder of this  notice  deals with collectively  agreed  interbank transaction  fees 
(multilateral  interchange  fees).  As  the  Commission  stated  in  its  decision  in  the 
Dutch Banks case, the position of  the Commission is that only in exceptional cases, where 
agreements on multilateral interchange fees  ar~ shown to be actually necessary for the 
successful  implementation  of certain  forms  of cooperation,  positive  in  themselves, 
between a number of  banks, may agreements on interchange fees be capable of obtaining 
an exemption under Article 85(3)<4l. It is not for the Commission to impose any particular 
arrangements on banks. Where, however, banks introduce interchange fee arrangements, 
the  Commission  (in  applying  the  criteria  set  out  in  Article  85(3)  for  obtaining  an 
exemption) will need to examine the economic benefit which these arrangements seek to 
achieve and consider whether consumers will receive a fair share of the resulting benefit 
and whether the particular interchange fee arrangements are actually necessary as a means 
to achieve that benefit. 
Automated Clearing House: a national payments clearing body. 
Decision of 19 July 1989, Dutch Banks, OJ  1989 L253/l, at paragraph 26. 
52 {b)  Double charging 
16.  "Double charging" occurs when the sender of a cross-border transfer requests to pay all 
the charges of the transfer (a so-called  "OUR"  transfer
5>),  but  nevertheless either an 
intermediary  bank  or  the .beneficiary's  bank  makes  a  deduction  from  the  amount 
transferred or the beneficiary's bank makes a charge to the beneficiary over and above the 
charge that would be made for a domestic transfer. 
17.  The Commission considers that the possibility for customers to make OUR transfers is 
beneficial. In certain circumstances, agreements on multilateral interchange fees may be 
necessary in order to avoid the practice of double charging cross-border transfers thus 
enabling banks to offer OUR transfers. If interchange fee arrangements were accepted for 
OUR transfers,  that does not imply that banks should impose :oUR payments on their 
customers<
6>.  · 
{c)  Costs for cross-border transfers 
18.  To carry out a cross-border transfer may require extra tasks as compared to a domestic 
transfer: 
(S) 
(6) 
(7) 
((I)  Iq relation to the system as a whole, a new system may need to be started up,  or 
an existing system modified, to process cross-border transfers. 
(2)  In relation to the transfer itself: 
(i)  a cross-border transfer may  n~::ed to be reported to the balance of payments 
authorities as an incoming payment{7); 
(ii)  the payment may need to be converted into the currency of the beneficiary; 
(iii)  the beneficiary may require more information (for example, details relating to 
the payment order) than is normally given for domestic payments; 
(iv)  the details of the beneficiary, their  account number and the bank sort code 
need to be verified since this information is often incomplete or incorrect; 
(v)  the payment order needs to be reformatted if it is to be processed by the 
clearing circuit in the destination country. 
Transfers can be describt:d as "OUR", "SHARE" or "BEN" depending on how the charges 
are allocated: 
- OUR: all charges to sender (our charges); 
- SHARE: share costs between sender and beneficiary; 
- BEN: all charges to the beneficiary. 
This is without prejudice to the outcome of  coordination proposals which the Commission 
is making which if  adopted would make OUR transfers the default solution where nothing 
has been specified by the sender of the transfer. 
These  statistical  reporting  requirements  vary  as  between  the  Member  States.  The 
Commission is actively  pursuing an exemption from all  reporting requirements for all 
intra-Union payments below ECU 10 000. 
53 19.  In  an  ideal  situation  (where  making  cross-border  payments  would  be assimilated  to 
making  domestic  payments)  these  extra tasks  would  no longer be needed.  In  such  a 
situation, which will  not occur for some time to come, the costs for receiving transfers 
from abroad should not be higher than those for receiving domestic transfers, the problem 
of double charging should not arise,  and  multilateral  interchange fees would not seem 
necessary. 
(d)  Avoiding double charging where cross-border transfers give rise to specific costs 
20.  In the absence of this ideal  situation there will be extra tasks required to make cross-
border transfers (paragraph above). Whenever the sending bank or a correspondent bank 
or ACH are able to carry  out those extra tasks,  the transfer could be entered into the 
domestic clearing circuit of the destination country as if it were a domestic transfer. This 
means that there would for the beneficiary's bank be no difference between receiving a 
transfer that has originated in another .country and receiving a purely domestic transfert
11>. 
21. 
(8) 
In such a situation,  the problem of double charging should not arise,  and  multilateral 
interchange fees would not seem necessary. This is one way in which extra tasks can be 
carried out without the need for multilateral interchange fees. 
Nevertheless, the  CommissiOn  recognizes that there may  continue to be circumstances 
where a beneficiary's bank will necessarily continue to face additional costs for the receipt 
of a cross-border transfer as compared to a domestic transfer. In particular, that will be 
the case in those Member  States which  require that the beneficiary's bank report  an 
incoming  payment  to  the  balance  of payments  authorities,  or ·which  require  that 
beneficiaries  receive  more  information  from  their  bank  than  is  normally  given  for 
domestic payments.  That will  also be the case where beneficiaries' banks have incurred 
the costs of setting up new systems (and here again the position will vary as between the 
different Member States).  In  such circumstances it may be justifiable for banks in the 
destination country to agree a multilateral interchange fee, to cover those additional costs, 
in order to avoid  double-charging.· Such  an  interchange fee  might be agreed between 
participants in  an  ACH,  or generally between all  or most banks of a particular country. 
Once a payment (of whatever origin) has been fed  into a domestic clearing system, and 
is thus necessarily indistinguishable from  a domestic payment, it should be treated as a 
domestic payment, also as far as costs and prices are concerned. 
54  . 22.  An arrangement between participants in an  ACH would cover the necessary extra costs 
of beneficiary's banks by means of an interchange fee agreed between the ACH and the  1 
participating beneficiary's banks.  This multilaterally  agreed  interchange fee  would  be ' 
based on the actual  extra costs of the beneficiary's banks, and ·could be included in the 
overall  (bilateral) fee charged by the ACH to sending banks (or sending ACHs).  The 
ACH  would  remunerate  beneficjary's  banks  for  their.  necessary  extra  costs  by 
redistributing to them the interchange fee. 
23.  An arrangement between all or most banks of a particular country would again cover the 
necessary  extra  costs  of beneficiary's  banks  by  means  of an  interchange  fee  agreed 
between al1  participating beneficiary's banks.  For any particular transfer,  one of those 
banks would  be acting as the correspondent (entry  point)  bank for the sending bank. 
Again, any multilaterally agreed interchange fee would be based on the actual extra costs 
of the beneficiary's banks, and could be included in the overall (bilateral) fee charged by 
correspondent banks to sending banks (or sending ACHs). The correspondent bank would 
remunerate beneficiary's banks for their necessary extra costs by redistributing to them 
the interchange fee. 
.. 
24.  Where multilateral interchange fees can be justified as being necessary to avoid double 
charging, they should meet the following conditions: 
(1)  the levels of any such fees should be set by reference to the actual additional costs 
incurred by beneficiary's banks, which presupposes perfect transparency in respect 
of these fees; 
(2)  the  fees  should  be  defined  as  maxima.  Members  of a  system  with  maximum 
interchange fees must be permitted, but are not obliged, to negotiate fees below the 
maximum, for example through bilateral rebates between participants. 
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